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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Colvin,1 the Minnesota Supreme Court struggled with 
whether the violation of an order for protection (“OFP”) could satisfy the 
predicate crime element of first-degree burglary.2  The court ultimately 
 
†  J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Organizational 
Communications, Xavier University, 2001. 
 1. 645 N.W.2d 449 (Minn. 2002). 
 2. See MINN. STAT. § 609.582, subd. 1 (2003) (providing that a defendant is guilty 
of first-degree burglary if he/she enters an occupied dwelling without consent and 
commits or intends to commit a crime while inside). 
1
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held that an OFP violation was insufficient to provide the basis for a 
first-degree burglary conviction.3  The court asserted that its review was 
limited to the stipulated facts of the trial court.4  Those facts, as 
interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, suggested that Colvin 
intended to violate only the “no-entry” provision of the OFP.5  Since the 
court found that Colvin merely intended to enter his ex-wife’s residence, 
his illegal conduct thereby resembled criminal trespass,6 not first-degree 
burglary.7  As a result, the court reversed Colvin’s burglary conviction.8 
This case note explores the history of protective orders both around 
the country and in Minnesota.9  It analyzes the law of burglary and its 
recent interaction with OFP violations in Minnesota,10 and then 
summarizes the Colvin case’s facts, procedural history, and Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision.11  Subsequently, this note criticizes the court’s 
decision amid its apparent misapplication of the trial court record and 
relevant law.12  Finally, the note analyzes Colorado’s approach to the 
issue of whether an OFP violation can satisfy the predicate crime 
requirement of burglary.13 
II. HISTORY OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS 
A.  The Fight for Protection 
Domestic violence has consistently led to an overwhelming number 
of injuries and deaths in the United States.  According to government 
statistics, domestic violence is the leading cause of injuries to women 
ages 15 to 44, and is more common than automobile accidents, 
muggings, and cancer deaths combined.14  Forty percent of all injured 
 
 3. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453-56. 
 4. Id. at 453. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1508 (7th ed. 1999) (defining trespass as 
“wrongful entry on another’s real property”). 
 7. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453-456. 
 8. Id. at 456. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
 13. See infra Part IV.D. 
 14. H.R. REP. NO. 103-395, at 26 (1993).  In addition, each year approximately 1.5 
million women and 500,000 men in the United States require immediate medical 
attention because of a domestic assault.  See Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, 
Introduction to DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1, 3 (Eve S. Buzawa & 
2
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women who need emergency room care have been assaulted by their 
partners.15 
In response to staggering statistics like these, and a surmounting 
social movement for gender equality, states have fought to enact 
domestic abuse protection laws to provide specific legal protection to 
abuse victims.16  This legislative effort directly addressed and 
contradicted thousands of years of adverse history17—a history that 
approved of and sanctioned domestic violence against women.18 
The history of domestic abuse can be traced as far back as Roman 
civil law, which gave a husband legal guardianship over his wife and 
included the right to physically chastise her.19  The Bible even condones 
the patriarchal institution of male dominance and implies physical abuse 
against women.20 
Moreover, English common law, which formed the basis for many 
statutes and policies in the United States, permitted a man to dominate 
and chastise his wife without legal repercussion.21  William Blackstone, 
the acclaimed English legal scholar, noted that “for as the husband is to 
answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to entrust him 
with the power of refraining her, by domestic chastisement.”22  
Historically, domestic abuse in the United States had been viewed as a 
 
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (observing that more than one-half of individuals injured in a 
domestic dispute seek medical care via a hospital emergency room). 
 15. See Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: 
Developing Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of 
Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 120 (1991) (citing Demie Kurz & Evan 
Stark, Not-So-Benign Neglect: The Medical Response to Battering, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES OF WIFE ABUSE 249-51 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)). 
 16. EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RESPONSE 109 (3d ed. 2003). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 57. 
 20. Id. at 58.  The Bible states, in part, that “[w]ives be subject to your husbands as 
you are to the Lord.  For the husband is the head of the wife just as Christ is the head of 
the church . . . .”  Ephesians 5:22-23.  Further, the Bible notes that, “when a wife while 
under her husband’s authority, goes astray and defiles herself or when a spirit of jealousy 
comes on a man and he is jealous of his wife, then he shall set the woman before the Lord 
and the priest shall apply this entire law to her.”  Numbers 5:29-30. 
 21. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 16, at 60. 
 22. Pamela M. Macktaz, Domestic Violence: A View from the Bench, 6 MD. J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 38 (1994-95) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 444); see also Gretchen P. Mullins, The Battered Woman and 
Homelessness, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 237, 239 (1994) (noting that historically under the doctrine 
of coverture a husband was entitled to discipline his wife without legal consequence). 
3
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private matter that should not monopolize precious judicial resources.23 
However, in the last thirty years states have begun to recognize that 
domestic abuse cannot be overlooked, and that victims must be afforded 
legal protection from their violent abusers.24 
B.  Protective Orders Around the Country 
States enacted comprehensive domestic violence protection laws in 
the late 1970s.25  These laws specifically demanded that the legal system 
no longer ignore domestic abuse issues.26  One of the most significant 
advances in these domestic abuse laws, now in all fifty states,27 has been 
 
 23. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 16, at 79-80 (asserting that police and 
judges would not typically arrest or convict men who abused their wives because the 
legal system did not regard domestic abuse as a top priority). 
 24. See Asmus et al., supra note 15, at 124. 
 25. In 1977, Pennsylvania became the first state to enact a comprehensive domestic 
violence act.  BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 16, at 109. 
 26. See id. at 71-96; see also Macktaz, supra note 22, at 39 (pointing out the 
apparent paradox when there was an “extended period of time when the criminal justice 
system responded one way to ‘stranger’ violence and another way to violence between 
intimates”). 
 27. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (2003); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (West 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-15-201 to 209 (Michie 2002) 
(amended by 2003 Ark. Acts 1221); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6320-6322 (West 2003); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-14-102 (West 2003) (amended by 2003 Colo. Legis. Serv. ch. 139 
(West)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-15 (West 2003) (effective Oct. 1, 2003); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 1042 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.30 (Harrison 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
13-4 (Harrison 2002) (amended by 2003 Ga. Laws Act 298); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 
(Michie 2002); IDAHO CODE § 39-6306 (Michie 2003); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 
(West 2003); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-2 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 236.4 (West 2002); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (Banks-Baldwin 
2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 
4006 (West 2003) (amended by 2003 Me. Legis. Serv. 372 (West)); MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 4-506 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2003); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 600.2950 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-
21-15 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.020 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204 
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 33.020 (Michie 2002); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-28 (West 2003); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5 (Michie 2002); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 2003); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (2003) (amended by 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 2003-107); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2003); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 22, §§ 60.2-60.4 (West 2002) (amended by 2003 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 407 (West)); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (2001); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 15-15-3 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-40 (Law. Co-op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-10-3 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605 (2003); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 85.021 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 1103 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Michie 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.50.030 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE § 48-5-509 (Michie 2003); WIS. STAT. § 813.12 
4
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the explicit power given to judges to grant injunctive protective orders to 
stop abuse immediately.28  Until specific domestic violence statutes were 
passed, injunctive orders to stop domestic abuse were extremely rare and 
were granted only in conjunction with divorce proceedings.29  These 
statutes now allow and encourage victims of domestic abuse to obtain a 
temporary restraining order against their alleged abusers.  Overall, 
domestic violence is a crime of terror and control in which the batterer 
establishes power over an intimate partner; protective orders seek to 
disrupt that pattern of control by providing legal protection from future 
harassment and violence.30 
Simply, an order for protection is a binding court mandate that 
provides immediate legal relief to victims by enjoining abusers from, at a 
minimum, future violence against their partners.31  Protective orders can 
also mandate child support and custody, prohibit future contact with the 
victim, and forbid entry into the victim’s residence.32 
A protective order can be obtained in an ex parte proceeding when 
the victim needs instant physical protection.33  An ex parte protection 
order is crucial because it provides immediate legal protection for the 
victim before a hearing is scheduled.34 
 
(West 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (Michie 2002). 
 28. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 16, at 109-12. 
 29. Id. at 233. 
 30. Domestic abuse has been regarded as: 
[A] pattern of coercive behavior that changes the dynamics of an intimate 
relationship within which it occurs.  Once the pattern of coercive control is 
established, both parties understand differently the meaning of specific 
actions and words.  Domestic violence is not simply a list of discrete 
behaviors, but is a pattern of behavior exhibited by the batterer that includes 
words, actions, and gestures, which, taken together, establish power and 
control over an intimate partner. 
Mary Ann Dutton, Expert Witness Testimony, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON 
YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE: A LAWYER’S HANDBOOK, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 8-8, 8-8 (Deborah M. Goelman et al. eds., 1996). 
 31. Peter Finn, Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection 
Orders Against Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 59 (1989) (concluding that temporary 
restraining orders are necessary tools in order to protect the victim from imminent harm 
from the batterer). 
 32. Cathleen A. Booth, No-Drop Policies: Effective Legislation or Protectionist 
Attitude?, U. TOL. L. REV. 621, 626 (1999). 
 33. Protective orders are distinguishable from criminal prosecutions in two respects: 
(1) civil rules of procedure apply and (2) the purpose of the order is meant to prevent 
future unlawful conduct and not to vindicate past offenses.  Finn, supra note 31, at 44. 
 34. Courts have consistently held that ex parte restraining orders, if administered 
properly, do not violate a defendant’s due process rights.  See Blazel v. Bradley, 698 F. 
Supp. 756, 768 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 287-88 (Minn. 
5
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Furthermore, domestic abuse laws carry strict penalties in an 
attempt to address a serious social problem.  The punishment for the 
violation of a protective order varies by state.35  Protective order 
violations can be punished via criminal charges, contempt of court, or a 
combination of the two.36  In forty-eight states, violation of a protective 
order is a separate offense.37  Thereby, no underlying crime of domestic 
abuse need be proven.38 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act 
(“VAWA”) to address the widespread domestic violence crisis.39  One of 
the most notable provisions of the VAWA is the section that institutes 
mandatory enforcement of protective orders in state and tribal courts.40  
This section, known as the full faith and credit provision, commands the 
states and Native American tribes to honor valid protective orders issued 
by sister states and tribes,41 and to treat those orders as if they were their 
own.42 
The VAWA seeks to underscore the necessity of state domestic 
 
1992); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229-36 (Mo. 1982); Marquette 
v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990, 995-96 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984). For instance, the Minnesota 
Domestic Abuse Act contains built-in procedural safeguards to protect defendants’ due 
process rights.  Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282 at 287-88.  These safeguards include proper 
service-of-process upon the defendant, a sworn affidavit alleging specific facts and 
circumstances of domestic violence, and allowing only judges to issue such orders.  Id. 
 35. David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal 
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1194-97 
(1995). 
 36. Id. at 1194. 
 37. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 16, at 114. 
 38. Id. 
 39. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 
Stat. 1902-1955 (1994) (officially codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 
42 U.S.C.).  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 605 (2000) (holding parts of 
the VAMA unconstitutional because Congress did not have proper authority under the 
Commerce Clause to enact the civil remedy provision; however, the provision prohibiting 
and criminalizing interstate violations of restraining orders remains good law). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2002). 
 41. However, protective orders are afforded full faith and credit under the VAMA 
only if the due process requirements of the issuing state were sufficiently met.  Catherine 
F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders Under the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253, 256 (1995).  The issuing court 
must have had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id.  
Furthermore, the defendant must receive proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
Id. 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2002) (stating that any order of protection “that is 
consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of one State or Indian tribe . . .  
shall be accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State or Indian tribe . . . and 
enforced as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe”). 
6
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violence legislation by requiring states to acknowledge protective orders 
issued by sister states.43  The VAWA responds to the critical domestic 
abuse problem in the United States, and displays the federal 
government’s integrated efforts to recognize and enforce protective 
orders. 
C.  Protective Orders in Minnesota 
In 1978 it was estimated that in Minnesota there were 26,900 
assaults on women by their partners.44  Faced with such tragic statistics, 
the Minnesota legislature enacted the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act in 
1979.45  This statute combated the specific problem of domestic abuse.46  
Originally, this statute provided a two-step procedure for a victim of 
domestic abuse to obtain an emergency ex parte restraining order.47  
First, the victim would need to petition the court ex parte for a temporary 
order for protection.48  This would be granted only if the victim alleged 
immediate and present physical danger.49  The emergency order, if 
granted, would stay in effect for no longer then seven days and would 
remain temporary in nature pending a final mandatory hearing.50  
Second, the court would schedule a subsequent hearing.51  At this time, 
 
 43. See Klein, supra note 41, at 253 (noting that the VAMA attempts to make 
“crimes committed against women considered in the same manner as those motivated by 
religious, racial, or political bias”). 
 44. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Minn. 1992) (citing Minn. Dep’t of 
Corrections, Minnesota Program for Battered Women, Biennial Report 1986-87, p. 12). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2002). 
 46. “Domestic abuse” as defined by the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act: 
means the following, if committed against a family or household member by 
a family or household member: 
physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; 
the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or 
terroristic threats, within the meaning of section 609.713, subdivision 1; 
criminal sexual conduct, within the meaning of section 609.342, 609.343, 
609.344, 609.345, or 609.3451; or interference with an emergency call 
within the meaning of section 609.78, subdivision 2. 
MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2)(a) (2002). 
 47. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(a) (1994); see also Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 285 
(stating that the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act is only a “band-aid” because the Act 
curbs short-term, not long-term, domestic abuse issues). 
 48. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(a) (1994). 
 49. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 4(b) (1994) (stating that the petition for the ex 
parte order must be accompanied by a sworn affidavit). 
 50. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(c) (1994). 
 51. Id. 
7
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the judge could formally extend the duration of the protective order.52 
In 1995 the Minnesota legislature amended the Domestic Abuse Act 
to allow victims of imminent violence to obtain a one-step, self-
finalizing ex parte protection order.53  Although a hearing is available for 
an alleged abuser, it is now not mandatory.54  If the abuser does not 
request a hearing, the protective order becomes final after five days.55  
The law now strives to eliminate administrative barriers that complicate 
applying for and obtaining protective orders.56 
A judge considering an ex parte order has a wide variety of relief 
within his/her discretion.  These include mandates that forbid future 
domestic abuse, exclude the batterer from the victim’s residence and 
workplace, order the continuance of insurance coverage, require 
counseling or treatment for the batterer, and provide for child custody, 
visitation and support.57 
In Minnesota, an OFP violation constitutes a misdemeanor crime 
punishable by three or more days in jail coupled with some form of 
counseling or court-designated program.58  However, if the defendant 
has committed an OFP violation or domestic violence crime in the past 
five years, the offense is upgraded to a gross misdemeanor,59 which 
results in a minimum of ten days of jail time accompanied by a 
counseling or court program.60  Finally, a defendant will be guilty of a 
felony, which carries a presumptive prison sentence, if the OFP violation 
amounts to the defendant’s third OFP infringement in the past five years 
or the defendant uses a dangerous weapon during the OFP violation.61  A 
violation of an order for protection also constitutes contempt of court.62 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(a) (2002). 
 54. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(c) (2002). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Presently, most domestic abuse protection order requests are handled and 
prepared by the clerk of the designated court to eliminate confusion and promote 
efficiency.  See MARTIN L. SWADEN & LINDA A. OLUP, 14 MINNESOTA PRACTICE 
SERIES—FAMILY LAW § 17.3 (2d ed. 2000).  For example, Hennepin County assists each 
petitioner in the preparation of both the OFP petition and affidavit through their domestic 
abuse office.  Id. 
 57. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7 (2002); see also 9A HENRY W. MCCARR & 
JACK S. NORDBY, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES—CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 57.3 
(3d ed. 2000). 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b). 
 59. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(c). 
 60. Id. 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d). 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b). 
8
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Overall, the Minnesota legislature has continually strived to curb 
domestic abuse by enacting and amending the Minnesota Domestic 
Abuse Act.63 
D.  The Intersection of OFP Violations and Burglary in Minnesota 
1.  Burglary 
The crime of first-degree burglary contains two elements: the 
defendant must (1) enter a dwelling without consent, and (2) intend to 
commit or commit a crime while another person, not an accomplice, is 
present inside.64  The state, when charging a defendant with first-degree 
burglary, has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt,65 that 
the defendant intended to commit or committed “some independent 
 
 63. Listed infra is a brief chronological history of several notable amendments to 
the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act since its inception in 1979: MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 
(1979) (allowing domestic abuse victims to obtain an OFP against abuser); MINN. STAT. § 
518B.01, subd. 6(f) (1981) (stating that an order for restitution issued under the Act is 
enforceable as a civil judgment); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 17 (1987) (mandating 
that in a custody proceeding, a court must consider the findings in a proceeding under the 
Act, or under a similar law of another state, that domestic abuse has occurred between the 
parties); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(9) (1990) (adding in part that a judge may 
order the petitioner’s protection at work); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 20 (1992) 
(providing that an OFP issued under the Act applies statewide); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, 
subd. 6(a)(11) (1993) (permitting the judge to order continuance of all insurance 
coverage); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(3) (1994) (including provision that allows 
a judge to exclude the abusing party from a “reasonable area surrounding the dwelling or 
residence”); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 7(a) (1995) (eliminating requirement that ex 
parte order be granted only pending a full hearing); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 6(a)(7) 
(2001) (authorizing the court to require the abusing party to successfully complete a 
domestic abuse counseling program or educational program). 
 64. In this case, only subsection (a) of Minnesota Statutes section 609.582 is 
pertinent to Colvin’s burglary conviction.  Thus, sections (b) and (c), dealing with 
dangerous weapons and assault, will not be discussed.  Minnesota Statutes section 
609.582 subdivision (1)(a) prescribes the elements of first-degree burglary, and reads as 
follows: 
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a 
crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while 
inside the building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary 
in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
than 20 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $35,000, or both, if: 
the building is a dwelling and another person, not an accomplice, is 
present in it when the burglar enters or at any time while the burglar is in 
the building. 
 65. See 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 100 (2003) (noting that to sustain a burglary 
conviction, the state must prove the burglary elements beyond a reasonable doubt).  
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crime [other than trespass] after entering the building illegally.”66  Intent 
to commit a predicate crime for the purposes of a burglary conviction is 
usually proven by circumstantial evidence.67 
For example, in State v. Adamson,68 the defendant kicked open the 
door to a residence and subsequently tried to escape by giving the 
occupant of the house a fake story, address, and phone number.69  The 
appellate court, looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the defendant’s entry into the house, affirmed the defendant’s first-
degree burglary conviction.70  The court stated, “[t]he evidence 
reasonably supports an inference appellant intended to commit a theft on 
the premises.”71 
However, if the court does not find sufficient evidence that the 
defendant intended to commit an independent crime, the burglary 
conviction will not stand.  In State v. Larson,72 the court reversed the 
defendant’s burglary conviction because no evidence supported the 
conclusion that the defendant intended to commit a crime when he 
entered his ex-wife’s home.73  Larson stands for the proposition that the 
state may not punish a defendant, via a burglary charge, by only 
presenting evidence that the defendant intended to commit a trespass and 
a trespass alone.74 
2.   State v. Roberson: Is an OFP violation enough? 
In State v. Roberson,75 the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered, 
for the first time, whether an OFP violation could satisfy the predicate 
crime requirement of a burglary conviction.76  The defendant in the case 
was subject to a valid OFP, which specifically prohibited him from 
 
 66. State v. Larson, 358 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 1984). 
 67. State v. Ring, 554 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).  Intent may be 
proven by circumstantial evidence since intent consists of a state of mind that is not 
directly physically observable.  State v. Hardimon, 310 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn. 1981); 
see also State v. Baskett, No. C6-00-931, 2001 WL 290627, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 
27, 2001). 
 68. 365 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 358 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 1984). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. No. C7-98-211, 1998 WL 690846, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1998). 
 76. Id. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/13
13 SCHIFALACQUA - PAGINATED.DOC 12/8/2003  2:56 PM 
2003] RESTRAINT OF COMMON SENSE:  STATE v. COLVIN 709 
 
entering his ex-girlfriend’s residence.77  Despite the OFP restrictions, the 
defendant illegally entered his ex-girlfriend’s residence by cutting a hole 
in a window screen while she was not home.78  When she returned home, 
the defendant, following a brief conversation with her, left the premises 
after she threatened to call 911.79  After being arrested, the defendant 
admitted he was aware of the OFP restrictions and that he violated those 
restrictions when he entered his ex-girlfriend’s residence.80  The 
defendant was charged and convicted of first-degree burglary.81  The 
defendant argued, on appeal, that an OFP violation cannot serve as the 
independent crime element of burglary because “like criminal trespass, 
the very act of entering the premises constitute[s] the OFP violation.”82 
The court of appeals rejected this reasoning and affirmed the 
defendant’s burglary conviction, asserting that “[v]iolation of an OFP is 
not an offense completely encompassed by the element of nonconsensual 
entry.”83  The court observed, “every burglary involves a trespass, but 
not every burglary involves a violation of an OFP.”84 
As the court noted, to secure a burglary conviction, the state must 
prove, in addition to a mere trespass, that the defendant both knew of and 
intentionally violated a valid OFP.85  Because the state is required to 
prove elements in addition to trespass, the court held that intent to violate 
an OFP satisfies the independent crime requirement of first-degree 
burglary.86 
III. CASE DESCRIPTION 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
On February 25, 1999, the Rochester Police Department received a 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at *2 (noting that an OFP violation has fundamentally distinct elements and 
simply because a violation of an OFP is easily proven should not take away from the fact 
that it is an independent crime). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  The court concluded that the elements of first-degree burglary, as construed 
by Larson, were sufficiently fulfilled by the facts of this case.  Id.  The three-judge panel 
unanimously affirmed Roberson’s burglary conviction.  Id. 
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call from Michelle Colvin who reported that her ex-husband, Peter Allen 
Colvin, entered her residence in violation of a valid OFP.87  After 
arriving at her residence, the police officers learned that Peter Colvin 
illegally entered her home, possibly through an unlocked window, while 
Michelle was at work.88  At approximately 6:10 p.m., A.M.E, a 15-year-
old girl who was staying with Michelle Colvin, came home and 
discovered Peter Colvin inside the residence drinking a beer and 
watching television.89  Mr. Colvin left immediately after A.M.E. asked 
him to do so.90 
The police later confirmed that Peter Colvin was prohibited, via a 
valid OFP,91 from contacting Michelle Colvin, entering her home or 
workplace, and committing domestic abuse against her.92  The OFP was 
valid for one year and was properly served on Mr. Colvin the same day it 
was issued.93  It was his third violation of that order.94 
The Olmsted County Attorney charged Mr. Colvin with violation of 
the OFP95 and first-degree burglary.96  Mr. Colvin moved to dismiss the 
burglary charges, arguing that he did not intend to commit a crime other 
than illegal entry.97  The trial court denied Mr. Colvin’s motion to 
dismiss.98  Pursuant to a plea agreement, the parties then submitted the 
 
 87. State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Minn. 2002). 
 88. Id.  Michelle Colvin reported to police that the defendant likely gained entry to 
her residence through a window in the dining room because that particular window would 
not properly lock and the blinds were disturbed.  Id. 
 89. Id.  Mr. Colvin had no legal interest in his ex-wife’s residence.  Respondent’s 
Brief at 5.  However, even if Mr. Colvin retained a legal ownership interest in the 
residence, the issuance of an OFP divests him of the right to lawfully enter the residence.  
See State v. Evenson, 554 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the 
defendant’s OFP, which prohibited him from entering the marital home, severed his right 
to lawfully possess/enter the marital home, and therefore he could rightfully be convicted 
of first-degree burglary when he broke into the residence and assaulted his ex-wife). 
 90. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 451. 
 91. Id. at 450.  Michelle Colvin obtained an emergency ex parte order for 
protection, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 515B.01 (2002), against her ex-
husband for the period of one year beginning on October 14, 1998.  Id. 
 92. Id. at 451.  The OFP prohibited Peter Colvin from entering any present or future 
residence that Michelle Colvin may inhabit, even if he was invited to do so.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 450-51. 
 94. Id. at 451; Respondent’s Brief at 5-6.  Since this was Mr. Colvin’s third 
infringement of the OFP, the violation ascends from a misdemeanor to a felony charge.  
See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2002). 
 95. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2002). 
 96. MINN. STAT. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2002). 
 97. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 451. 
 98. Id. 
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burglary charge to the court on stipulated facts99 and dropped the OFP 
charge.100  Mr. Colvin was found guilty of first-degree burglary.101 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding 
that an OFP violation satisfies the predicate crime element102 of 
burglary.103  The court reasoned that since the state must prove that the 
defendant committed or intended to commit additional illegal actions, as 
well as trespass (namely the knowing violation of a valid OFP), Colvin’s 
burglary conviction could stand.104  The court noted that Colvin was 
imminently aware of his OFP restrictions because he was properly served 
with the OFP and had been charged and convicted of a previous OFP 
offense not less then six months earlier.105  Colvin appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court on the issue of whether an OFP violation is 
sufficient to provide the basis for a burglary conviction.106 
B.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Holding 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, Justice Lancaster107 writing for the 
 
 99. Id.  A stipulated fact trial is a procedure outlined in State v. Lothenbach, 296 
N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1980) in which the defendant may preserve and obtain review of a 
pretrial issue without the need for a full trial.  Id. at 857. Accordingly, the defendant 
stipulates to the evidence against him/her.  Id.  A Lothenbach stipulated fact trial is held 
before a judge who examines the complaint and evidence against the defendant and rules 
subsequently (more than likely finding the defendant guilty). See HENRY W. MCCARR & 
JACK S. NORBY, 9 MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES—CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 37.4 
p. 245-48 (3d ed. 2001).  The defendant waives his/her right to a jury trial, the right to 
call witnesses and the right to be confronted with his/her accuser.  Id. 
 100. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 451. 
 101. Id. (noting that the district court found Mr. Colvin violated Minnesota Statutes 
section 609.582, subd. 1(a) by entering Ms. Colvin’s residence without consent and 
intending to commit the crime of violating an OFP while another person was present 
inside the residence). 
 102. See MINN. STAT. § 609.582, subd. 1(a) (2002) (states that a defendant must enter 
an occupied dwelling without consent and intend to commit or commit a crime). 
 103. State v. Colvin, 629 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing an 
OFP violation from a mere trespass by asserting that “every burglary involves a trespass, 
but, not every burglary involves a violation of an order for protection”).  Id. at 138. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 138-39. 
 106. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 450. 
 107. President George W. Bush subsequently selected Justice Joan Lancaster to 
succeed Judge Paul A. Magnuson on the federal district court of Minnesota.  The U.S. 
Senate unanimously confirmed her appointment on April 25, 2002.  See Tom Webb, U.S. 
District Court: Senate Confirms Lancaster for Judgeship, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 
26, 2002, at B3, available at http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/local/ 
3139695.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2003). 
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majority, held108 that Mr. Colvin’s OFP violation was insufficient to 
establish first-degree burglary,109 absent commission of or intent to 
commit a crime other than violation of an OFP.110  According to the 
court, if the state had established the commission of or intent to commit 
another crime, such as assault or terroristic threats, the predicate crime 
requirement, and in turn a burglary conviction, could be sustained.111  
However, the court asserted that it was bound to the trial court’s 
stipulated facts.112  It noted that the record lacked any evidence 
suggesting Colvin committed or intended to commit a crime other than 
an OFP violation.113 
As maintained by the court, not only was the violation of the OFP 
the sole crime Colvin intended to commit, but also the only stipulation of 
the OFP he intended to break was the “no-entry” provision.114  If Colvin 
intended to violate the other OFP provisions,115 his actions would not 
resemble a trespass.116  According to the supreme court’s reading of the 
trial court’s findings, Colvin intended only to enter his ex-wife’s house 
and not to contact, harass, or abuse her.117  The court held that the trial 
court’s stipulated facts definitively established Mr. Colvin’s lack of 
intent to commit any crime other than a violation of the “no-entry” 
provision of the OFP.118 
The majority relied heavily on State v. Larson119 when reasoning 
 
 108. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 456 (Russell A. Anderson & Gilbert, JJ., dissenting). 
 109. The court stated that construction of a criminal statute, such as the one here, is a 
question of law subject to de novo review and all reasonable doubt in the statute should 
be resolved in favor of the defendant.  Id. at 452 (citing State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 
909, 914 (Minn. 1996)); see also State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 1982). 
 110. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453. 
 111. Id. at 452. 
 112. Id. at 455. 
 113. Id. at 456 (noting that “[u]nder the stipulated facts . . . there is no allegation that 
Colvin committed or intended to commit a crime other than a violation of the OFP”; thus 
a burglary charge would be inappropriate). 
 114. Id. at 452. 
 115. Once again, Colvin was prohibited from contacting his ex-wife, entering her 
home and workplace, and committing any acts of domestic abuse against her.  Id. at 451. 
 116. Id. at 452. 
 117. Id.  The court asserts that, as an appellate court, it cannot engage in extrinsic 
fact-finding, and it will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous.  Id. at 453 (citing State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 15, 32 (Minn. 
2000)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. 358 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1984) (holding that when the state’s evidence proves 
only trespassory intent, and not intent to commit an independent crime, the defendant’s 
conviction of burglary must be vacated). 
14
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that violation of a “no-entry” provision of an OFP cannot serve as the 
predicate crime to establish a burglary.120  The court reiterated and 
applied the holding in Larson when it ruled that the state must “do more 
than establish an intent to commit the crime of trespass” to fulfill the 
elements of first-degree burglary.121 
The court stressed that the violation of the “no-entry” provision of 
an OFP is similar to actions of a trespass122 and thus cannot satisfy both 
elements of burglary.123  As a result, the court reversed Mr. Colvin’s 
conviction in its entirety.124 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COLVIN DECISION 
State v. Colvin gave the Minnesota Supreme Court a pivotal 
opportunity to recognize, in burglary cases, the unmistakable distinction 
between a mere trespasser and an abusive ex-spouse who acts in direct 
contravention of a court order.  Unfortunately, the court improperly 
analyzed both the trial court record and the relevant case law.  The 
court’s forced interpretation of the facts and law in Colvin has led to a 
misguided and absurd result that undermines the very purpose of 
Minnesota’s domestic violence legislation.125 
A.  Misstating the Record 
The court states, repeatedly, that Colvin came before it on stipulated 
facts, and therefore it must accept the trial court’s findings.126  This may 
be accurate regarding the scope of an appellate court’s review;127 
however, the court grossly misinterpreted the trial court’s decision.  The 
 
 120. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453-54. 
 121. Id. at 454 (quoting Larson, 358 N.W.2d at 670). 
 122. Id. at 455 (stating that violation of an OFP and trespass satisfy only the illegal 
entry element of burglary and not the predicate crime element). 
 123. Id. at 454-55; See MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION 
GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CRIMINAL) CRIMJIG 17.02 (Richard D. 
Hodson, rep.) in 10A MINN. PRACTICE, 5-6 (3d ed. 1990) (defining first-degree burglary 
as entering a dwelling with the intent to commit an independent crime while another 
person, not an accomplice, is present inside the dwelling). 
 124. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 456. 
 125. See generally Mary Schouvieller, Leaping without Looking: Chapter 142’s 
Impact on Ex Parte Protection Orders and the Movement Against Domestic Violence in 
Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. 593, 598-610 (1996). 
 126. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453. 
 127. See, e.g., State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2000). 
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trial court, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, held that Mr. 
Colvin intended to violate only the “no-entry” provision of the OFP.128  
This is not an accurate reading of the trial court’s decision.  The entire 
trial court decision, issued by Judge Joseph F. Chase, is as follows: 
Pursuant to State v. Lothenbach, 296 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 
1980), Defendant waived his right to jury trial in this matter 
and stipulated to the prosecution’s evidence, submitted to the 
court in the form of police reports.  The court, having reviewed 
those reports, as well as Judge Jacobson’s September 29, 1999 
Order and Memorandum on the legal issue raised by the 
defense in this matter, hereby finds as follows: 
1. On February 25, 1999, Defendant entered the building 
located at [address]; 
2. He did so without consent; 
3. In entering the building, he intended to and did commit a 
crime—specifically violation of the October 14, 1998 Order 
for Protection which excluded Defendant from that building; 
4. The building was a dwelling, and; 
5. Another person, not an accomplice, was present in the 
building during some of the time that Defendant was in the 
building.129 
The supreme court rests its entire decision on two short phrases 
found in section 3, “in entering the building” and “which excluded 
Defendant from that building.”130  These phrases are used to 
conclusively establish that the trial court found Colvin in violation of 
only the “no-entry” provision of the OFP, rather than the OFP as a 
whole.131 
However, if the findings are critically analyzed, a different practical 
deduction emerges.  The two phrases in section 3 are simply modifiers 
that are not meant to specify the exact provision of the OFP that was 
violated.  The first phrase observes that the defendant had the intent to 
break the OFP when entering the dwelling.  The other phrase acts as a 
simple additive, referring the reader back to section 1, noting that the 
building Colvin entered was the same listed in the OFP.  In fact, the trial 
court explicitly stated that Colvin’s predicate crime was the violation of 
 
 128. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453. 
 129. State v. Colvin, No. K7-99-1441 (3d Dist. Ct. Minn. Apr. 10, 2000) (finding 
defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree). 
 130. See Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 453. 
 131. Id. at 453-55. 
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the OFP; Colvin “intended to and did commit a crime—specifically 
violation of the October 14, 1998 Order for Protection.”132  The phrases 
the majority relies upon were added for grammatical ease and should not 
detract from the court’s straightforward holding, which did not list the 
exact provision that Colvin violated.  If the decision was ambiguous to 
the supreme court, then it should have remanded the decision for 
clarification and should not have, in one fell swoop, reversed Colvin’s 
conviction while categorically barring every OFP violation from ever 
providing the predicate crime for a burglary charge. 
Furthermore, if the court did not wish to remand the case, it could 
have looked to what the trial judge relied upon in making his decision—
namely, Judge Debra J. Jacobson’s Omnibus Order and legal 
Memorandum.133  Essentially, the legal issue of whether an OFP can 
satisfy the burglary elements was heard and decided by Judge 
Jacobson.134  Judge Chase then simply entered a guilty finding in 
accordance with Judge Jacobson’s ruling after the parties agreed to 
stipulate to the facts.135 
Judge Jacobson’s Memorandum mentions Colvin’s OFP violation 
only in the general sense136 and does not qualify the violation to any one 
provision therein.137  The Memorandum states, in part, “[t]he violation of 
an order for protection is sufficient to act as the predicate crime to the 
charge of burglary in the first degree.”138  Judge Jacobson’s thoughtful 
and clear-cut Memorandum was sufficiently examined by Judge Chase 
before he issued his ruling.139  Once again, the trial court unmistakably 
held that an OFP violation, in its general sense, can satisfy the elements 
of first-degree burglary.140  The majority of the supreme court 
erroneously misstated the trial court’s findings141 and consequently 
 
 132. Colvin, No. K7-99-1441. 
 133. See Omnibus Order and Memorandum, State v. Colvin, No. K7-99-1441 (3d 
Dist. Ct. Minn. Sept. 29, 1999). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Colvin, No. K7-99-1441. 
 136. See Omnibus Order and Memorandum, supra note 133, at 3. 
 137. In fact, according to the memorandum, the defendant did not even argue that his 
OFP violation was only an infringement of the “no-entry” provision.  Id.  Judge Jacobson, 
in referring to the defendant’s legal argument, states that “[d]efendant asserts that 
burglary cannot be predicated upon the intent to violate an order for protection.”  Id. 
 138. Id. at 3-4. 
 139. See Colvin, No. K7-99-1441 (“The court, having reviewed those reports, as well 
as Judge Jacobson’s September 29, 1999 Order and Memorandum on the legal issue 
raised by the defense in this matter, hereby finds as follows . . . .”). 
 140. Id. 
 141. State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Minn. 2002) (Russell A. Anderson, J., 
17
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based its decision on a skewed and narrow reading of the trial court’s 
holding.   
The supreme court should have considered the trial court’s decision 
in its entirety.  The trial court clearly held that Colvin intended to 
commit, and did commit, a burglary that was predicated upon his OFP 
violation.  A common sense and accurate reading of the trial court 
decision was unfairly sacrificed in this case. 
B.  Misapplying the Law 
1.  State v. Larson 
After interpreting the trial court’s holding, the supreme court relied 
immensely on State v. Larson,142 which held that a defendant who only 
trespasses on another’s property without intent to commit an independent 
crime could not be found guilty of burglary.143  In other words, a “mere 
trespasser” cannot be subject to a burglary charge.144  Larson can be 
distinguished on several levels and should not have controlled the 
outcome of Colvin.145 
Primarily, Mr. Colvin was prohibited via a valid OFP from entering 
his ex-wife’s home and having any contact with her.146  The defendant in 
Larson was not subject to OFP restrictions.147  Thus, the defendant in 
Larson did not commit the independent crime of an OFP violation when 
he entered his ex-wife’s residence because he was never specifically 
mandated to stay away from her.148 
Furthermore, the defendant in Larson was not seen as a serious 
 
dissenting) (correcting the majority by asserting that “the district court stated that the 
specific violation was simply violation of the OFP, not the no-entry part of the order.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 142. 358 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1984). 
 143. Id. at 670 (arguing that “to allow an intent to commit a trespass to satisfy the 
requirement of intent to commit a crime would mean that a mere trespasser who had no 
intent other than to enter or remain in a building” could be successfully prosecuted for 
burglary). 
 144. Id. 
 145. In Colvin the court expressly rejected a portion of the analysis in Larson, which 
took into account the relationship between the victim and the intruder to determine intent.  
Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 455.  The court, in Colvin, discarded this notion and expressed 
that an ex-husband generally does not have any greater right to be on his ex-wife’s 
property than a stranger.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 450-51.  See also Respondent’s Brief at 9. 
 147. Larson, 358 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1984); Respondent’s Brief at 9. 
 148. See Larson, 358 N.W.2d at 670. 
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threat to his ex-wife or her property because “in a number of prior 
unconsented entries, he apparently had done nothing criminal once 
inside.”149  This contrasts the Colvin case because Mr. Colvin had 
previously stolen both money and personal belongings from his ex-
wife’s residence and, as a result, was ordered to pay $900 in restitution to 
Michelle Colvin for his illegal conduct.150 
In addition, Peter Colvin had not only broken into Michelle 
Colvin’s house previously,151 but had placed her in a state of imminent 
fear of physical abuse.152  Peter Colvin had threatened violence against 
both Michelle Colvin and her children on prior occasions.153  Michelle 
Colvin then sought and obtained legal protection from her ex-husband.154  
She successfully asserted that she was in immediate danger of physical 
abuse from Peter Colvin, evinced by his threatening behavior.155  It is 
inappropriate to characterize Mr. Colvin as a “mere trespasser” because, 
unlike the defendant in Larson, Colvin’s persistent aggressive behavior 
has warranted specific government protection.156  The court’s 
characterization of the defendant in Larson as a “mere trespasser” may or 
may not have been accurate, but the depiction of Mr. Colvin as a “mere 
trespasser” in light of his past threatening and illegal conduct could not 
be farther from the truth.157 
Justice Russell A. Anderson, writing for the dissent, astutely notes 
that “the effect of the majority’s ruling is to erase any distinction 
between a court-prohibited entry into a home by a person with a court-
identified propensity to harm . . . and a mere trespass into a building by a 
stranger.”158  Overall, the court wrongly extended the holding in Larson, 
and, in turn, makes an inadvertent trespasser indistinguishable from an 
aggressive ex-spouse who intentionally violates a binding court order.159 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 456 n.1 (Russell A. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 457. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Colvin v. Colvin, No. F6-98-3106 (3d Dist. Ct. Minn. Oct. 14, 1999) 
(Emergency (Ex Parte) Order For Protection). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 450-51.  
 157. Mr. Colvin had previously brought alcohol and drugs into Michelle’s home.  Id. 
at 457 (Russell A. Anderson, J., dissenting).  Colvin had also invited friends of his into 
the home, which subsequently resulted in an allegation of inappropriate conduct with the 
children.  Id. 
 158. Id. at 458. 
 159. See id. at 456-58. 
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2.  Let the Domestic Abuse Act Stand on Its Own Two Feet 
When reviewing a criminal conviction, Minnesota appellate courts 
construe and interpret the applicable criminal statute by its plain 
language.160  The appellate courts are guided by the “natural and most 
obvious meaning” of the statutory language.161  As a result, “the plain 
meaning and language of a statute will normally end” the statutory 
inquiry.162 
In Colvin, the majority concluded that Peter Colvin’s OFP violation 
did not fall within the parameters of the burglary statute because his 
violation only involved mere entry.163  However, a common sense 
analysis of the burglary statute offers a different conclusion.  The plain 
language of the first-degree burglary statute reads, in part: “[w]hoever 
enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime, or 
enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the 
building . . . commits burglary in the first degree . . . .”164 
First, it is undisputed that Colvin entered his ex-wife’s residence 
without consent, as evidenced by his break-in through a window when 
she was at work.165  Second, it is equally evident that Colvin intended to 
commit, and indeed did commit, a crime at Michelle Colvin’s 
residence—namely the violation of an OFP.  Mr. Colvin was properly 
served with the OFP, had previously been convicted for violating it, and 
promptly left the residence on February 19, 1999, when A.M.E requested 
he do so.166  These facts undeniably demonstrate that Colvin knew at the 
moment of entry that he was in direct violation of a legally binding court 
order.167 
 
 160. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 452. 
 161. See State v. Richardson, 633 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 162. State v. Larson, 605 N.W.2d 706, 714 (Minn. 2000). However, a statute should 
not be interpreted to create criminal offenses that the legislature did not contemplate. 
State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985).  But it is clear that the legislature, 
when enacting the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, intended to treat domestic abuse and 
OFP violations seriously and with stiff penalties.  See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14 
(2002).  Quite indicative of legislative intent, the Domestic Abuse Act does not contain 
an exclusive remedy provision, and in fact, the Domestic Abuse Act specifically states 
“[a]ny proceeding under this section shall be in addition to other civil or criminal 
remedies.”  MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 16.  This demonstrates the legislative intent to 
encourage battered women and prosecutors to find relief from domestic violence in a 
number of ways, not necessarily exclusive to the Act itself. 
 163. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 455. 
 164. MINN. STAT. § 609.582, subd. 1 (2002). 
 165. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 451. 
 166. State v. Colvin, 629 N.W.2d 135, 138-39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 167. See id. 
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In addition, the knowing violation of an OFP is a crime by itself.168  
The predicate crime required for a first-degree burglary conviction 
includes misdemeanor crimes169 such as an OFP violation.  And further, 
the breach of any OFP restriction comprises a full violation of the order 
calling for complete criminal consequences associated with that 
violation.170  Simply, in accordance with a fair reading of the plain 
language of the burglary statute, Colvin’s illegal actions constituted a 
burglary.  Colvin entered a dwelling without consent and purposely 
committed a crime at that dwelling.   
To combat this sound reading of the statute, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated, “the same entry is insufficient to satisfy both the illegal 
entry element of the burglary statute and the independent-crime 
requirement.”171  Unfortunately, the court dictates that the violation of a 
“no-entry” OFP, and in reality other forms of OFP violations, is wholly 
consumed by a trespass.  By holding that a burglary cannot be predicated 
on an OFP violation, the court diminishes the strength and purpose of the 
Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act by trivializing OFP violations, even if 
those violations were only infringements of “no-entry” provisions. 
An OFP violation and a trespass are crimes enacted for different 
reasons and meant to address different social concerns.  The Minnesota 
Domestic Abuse Act172 specifically targets domestic violence by 
criminalizing OFP violations.173  The statute prescribes enhanced 
punishments for violating an OFP, which are penalties not present in the 
trespass statute.174 
Trespass and an OFP violation are fundamentally different crimes 
and “the two, one an offense against a person and the other against 
property . . . should not be merged indiscriminately . . . .”175  Moreover, 
trespass does not wholly encompass an OFP violation.176  Because the 
violation of an OFP is an independent crime that has been separately 
enacted by the legislature, its direct violation should unquestionably 
 
 168. See MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a)-(d) (2002). 
 169. Colvin, 629 N.W.2d at 138 (citing State v. Olson, 382 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986)). 
 170. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14 (2002). 
 171. State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Minn. 2002). 
 172. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2002). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See MINN. STAT. § 609.605 (2002). 
 175. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 458 (Russell A. Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 176. See State v. Roberson, No. C7-98-211, 1998 WL 690846, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 6, 1998). 
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qualify as the predicate crime for burglary.177  The plain and reasonable 
interpretation of the burglary statute should have been followed in this 
case. 
3.  Circumstantial Evidence 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s function, when reviewing the 
evidence from a trial court, is not to try the facts anew, but to “determine 
from the record as a whole whether the evidence permits the inference 
required to justify a conviction.”178  The Minnesota case law, including 
State v. Larson,179 permits the reviewing court to consider circumstantial 
evidence to determine whether the fact finder’s inference of intent was 
justified.180  The court in this case mistakenly failed to entertain 
circumstantial evidence (which was included in the trial court record) 
that Mr. Colvin intended to not only enter Michelle Colvin’s residence, 
but also to contact and harm her.181 
Peter Colvin has a prolonged history of allegations involving 
threatening behavior and alcohol abuse.182  Colvin illegally entered his 
ex-wife’s home while she was at work, drank a 40-ounce beer and waited 
there for several hours until after 6:00 p.m.183  The court blatantly 
 
 177. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 191 (7th ed. 1999) (defining burglary as the 
“modern statutory offense of breaking and entering any building with the intent” to 
commit a crime). 
 178. State v. Crosby, 277 Minn. 22, 24, 151 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1967) (citing State v. 
Kline, 266 Minn. 372, 373, 124 N.W.2d 416, 418 (1963)). 
 179. 358 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1984). 
 180. See Colvin, 645 N.W.2d at 457 (Russell A. Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating 
that consideration of circumstantial evidence to determine if one is a “mere trespasser” is 
part of the court’s normal review); Larson, 358 N.W.2d at 670-71; Crosby, 277 Minn. at 
25, 151 N.W.2d at 300 (noting that “proof of intent to commit a crime in connection with 
proof of burglary is always one that must rest on a permissible inference from the facts 
proved” at the trial court); State v. Ring, 554 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) 
(observing that “intent must generally be proved from the circumstances surrounding the 
defendant’s acts”). 
 181. See, e.g., State v. Mills, 289 Minn. 528, 529, 185 N.W.2d 276, 277 (1971) 
(court looks at the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the defendant’s intent upon 
entry); see also Crosby, 277 Minn. at 25, 151 N.W.2d at 299  (holding that circumstantial 
evidence is entitled to the same weight as other evidence, although reviewed with more 
scrutiny). 
 182. Colvin has had two convictions for DWI, a conviction for escape from custody, 
and several arrests for criminal damage to property, trespass, disorderly conduct, and 
child neglect.  Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Database Record of Peter 
Allen Colvin; Records and Investigation Information Report of Peter Allen Colvin 
included in the stipulated fact trial.  Michelle Colvin had also alleged that Mr. Colvin 
threatened to kill her and the children.  OFP Aff. at 3. 
 183. Respondent’s Brief at 3. 
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disregarded both Colvin’s past behavior and the circumstances that 
surrounded his entry because of its reliance on a mistaken interpretation 
of the trial court’s findings of fact.  Colvin’s past aggressive behavior in 
addition to his illegal actions that day suggest he intended to contact and 
possibly injure his ex-wife. 
These circumstances, which were privy to the trial court and its 
decision,184 should not have been brushed aside by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.  By doing so, it ignores both Colvin’s true intent and the 
actual ruling of the trial court. 
4.  An Absurd Result 
When interpreting statutes, the courts are required “to consider 
objects which the legislature seeks to accomplish by the statute and the 
mischief sought to be remedied, and to avoid a result which would be 
absurd or would do violence to the language of the statute.”185  The 
court’s construction of the burglary statute in this case has indeed led to 
an absurd result.186 
In reality, the court’s analysis prescribes a harsher result for a man 
who enters a residence in a drunken stupor without any connection to it 
than for a man with a history of intimidation and abuse allegations who 
enters contrary to a court order.187  Surely by enacting the Domestic 
Abuse Act to protect victims from domestic violence, the legislature did 
not intend to provide extended protection to abusers at the expense of the 
victims.188 
C.  The Correct Decision—Colorado Leads the Way 
Violation of the OFP should have constituted the predicate crime for 
Mr. Colvin’s burglary conviction.  Colorado has taken the lead in this 
area of law.  In People v. Rhorer,189 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld 
the defendant’s second-degree burglary190 conviction for entering his 
 
 184. This information was included in the evidence before the court in the stipulated 
fact trial. 
 185. Peterson v. Haule, 230 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1975). 
 186. See Respondent’s Brief at 12. 
 187. See State v. Mills, 289 Minn. 528, 529, 185 N.W.2d 276, 277 (1971) (inferring 
intent to commit an additional independent crime when defendant was found drunk in a 
building to which he had no known connection). 
 188. Respondent’s Brief at 13. 
 189. 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998). 
 190. In Colorado a defendant commits second-degree burglary when he/she “breaks 
an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful 
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former girlfriend’s house in violation of a valid restraining order.191  The 
court noted that violation of a restraining order could in fact serve as the 
predicate crime for the purposes of the defendant’s burglary 
conviction.192  The court stated that the Colorado General Assembly had 
enacted a specific statute that made the violation of a restraining order a 
crime separate from trespass.193  Thus, it was found to satisfy the 
independent crime element of burglary.194  Because the jury found that 
the defendant possessed the requisite intent to violate the restraining 
order195 and because the violation of a restraining order under Colorado 
law is a crime, the conviction was unanimously upheld.196 
Subsequently, the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. 
Widhalm197 held that a first-degree burglary conviction could be 
predicated upon a restraining order violation198 because such a violation 
clearly fulfills the independent crime element of burglary.199  Colorado’s 
common sense approach to the interpretation of their burglary statutes, 
the language of which is equivalent to Minnesota statutes, should have 
been employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Colvin. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Colvin has not only 
reversed Mr. Colvin’s burglary conviction, but has also diminished the 
autonomy and strength of the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act.  Colvin 
has categorically undermined the protections and goals of the Act.200  
Furthermore, the court rested its decision on an inappropriate reading of 
both the trial court record and relevant case law.  The enhanced 
protections that the Minnesota legislature sought to bestow upon battered 
 
entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against 
another person or property.”  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-203 (2003). 
 191. Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 150. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5 (2003). 
 194. Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 151 n.6. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 150-51. 
 197. 991 P.2d 291 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 198. Id. at 294. 
 199. Compare State v. Marquez, 649 A.2d 114, 117-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994) (holding that burglary conviction could not be based solely on defendant’s entry 
into apartment in violation of protective order) with People v. Smith, 943 P.2d 31, 33 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (ruling that entry in violation of a restraining order is sufficient to 
support burglary conviction). 
 200. See Schouvieller, supra note 125, at 637-42. 
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partners201 have been partially stripped away by this decision. 
And, in reality, this decision will absolutely bar all OFP violations, 
no matter how blatant, from ever being prosecuted as burglaries.  The 
court’s misguided decision undercuts the very purpose of the Minnesota 
Domestic Abuse Act.202  Sadly, Michelle Colvin has once again been left 
without any genuine protection from her ex-husband. 
 
 
 201. See generally MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2002). 
 202. Schouvieller, supra note 125, at 637-42. 
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